Bureaucracy
Weber's interest in the nature of power and authority,
as well as his pervasive preoccupation with modern trends of rationalization,
led him to concern himself with the operation of modern large-scale enterprises
in the political, administrative, and economic realm. Bureaucratic coordination
of activities, he argued, is the distinctive mark of the modern era. Bureaucracies
are organized according to rational principles. Offices are ranked in a
hierarchical order and their operations are characterized by impersonal
rules. Incumbents are governed by methodical allocation of areas of jurisdiction
and delimited spheres of duty. Appointments are made according to specialized
qualifications rather than ascriptive criteria. This bureaucratic coordination
of the actions of large numbers of people has become the dominant structural
feature of modern forms of organization. Only through this organizational
device has large- scale planning, both for the modern state and the modern
economy, become possible. Only through it could heads of state mobilize
and centralize resources of political power, which in feudal times, for
example, had been dispersed in a variety of centers. Only with its aid
could economic resources be mobilized, which lay fallow in pre-modern times.
Bureaucratic organization is to Weber the privileged instrumentality that
has shaped the modern polity, the modern economy, the modern technology.
Bureaucratic types of organization are technically superior to all other
forms of administration, much as machine production is superior to handicraft
methods.
Yet Weber also noted the dysfunctions of bureaucracy.
Its major advantage, the calculability of results, also makes it unwieldy
and even stultifying in dealing with individual cases. Thus modern rationalized
and bureaucratized systems of law have become incapable of dealing with
individual particularities, to which earlier types of justice were well
suited. The "modern judge," Weber stated in writing on the legal system
of Continental Europe, " is a vending machine into which the pleadings
are inserted together with the fee and which then disgorges the judgment
together with the reasons mechanically derived from the Code."
Weber argued that the bureaucratization of the
modern world has led to its depersonalization.
[The calculability of decision-making]
and with it its appropriateness for capitalism . . [is] the more fully
realized the more bureaucracy "depersonalizes" itself, i.e., the more completely
it succeeds in achieving the exclusion of love, hatred, and every purely
personal, especially irrational and incalculable, feeling from the execution
of official tasks. In the place of the old-type ruler who is moved by sympathy,
favor, grace, and gratitude, modern culture requires for its sustaining
external apparatus the emotionally detached, and hence rigorously "professional"
expert.
Further bureaucratization and rationalization seemed
to Weber an almost inescapable fate.
Imagine the consequences of that comprehensive
bureaucratization and rationalization which already today we see approaching.
Already now . . . in all economic enterprises run on modern lines, rational
calculation is manifest at every stage. By it, the performance of each
individual worker is mathematically measured, each man becomes a little
cog in the machine and, aware of this, his one preoccupation is whether
he can become a bigger cog. . . . It is apparent today we are proceeding
towards an evolution which resembles [the ancient kingdom of Egypt] in
every detail, except that it is built on other foundations, on technically
more perfect, more rationalized, and therefore much more mechanized foundations.
The problem which besets us now in not: how can this evolution be changed?--for
that is impossible, but: what will come of it?
Weber's views about the inescapable rationalization
and bureaucratization of the world have obvious similarities to Marx's
notion of alienation. Both men agree that modern methods of organization
have tremendously increased the effectiveness and efficiency of production
and organization and have allowed an unprecedented domination of man over
the world of nature. They also agree that the new world of rationalized
efficiency has turned into a monster that threatens to dehumanize its creators.
But Weber disagrees with Marx when the latter sees alienation as only a
transitional stage on the road to man's true emancipation. Weber does not
believe in the future leap from the realm of necessity into the world of
freedom. Even though he would permit himself upon occasion the hope that
some charismatic leader might arise to deliver mankind from the curse of
its own creation, he thought it more probable that the future would be
an "iron cage" rather than a Garden of Eden.
There is yet another respect in which Weber differed
from, or rather enlarged upon, Marx. In accord with his focus on the sphere
of economic production, Marx had documented in great detail how the capitalist
industrial organization led tot eh expropriation of the worker form the
means of production; how the modern industrial worker, in contrast to the
artisan of the handicraft era, did not own his own tools and was hence
forced to sell his labor to those who controlled him. Agreeing with most
of this analysis, Weber countered with the observation that such expropriation
from the means of work was an inescapable result of any system of rationalized
and centrally coordinated production, rather than being a consequence of
capitalism as such. Such expropriation would characterize a socialist system
of production just as much as it would the capitalist form. Moreover, Weber
argued, Marx's nearly exclusive concern with the productive sphere led
him to overlook the possibility that the expropriation of the workers from
the means of production was only a special case of a more general phenomenon
in modern society where scientists are expropriated from the means of research,
administrators from the means of administration, and warriors from the
means of violence. He further contended that in all relevant spheres of
modern society men could no longer engage in socially significant action
unless they joined a large-scale organization in which they were allocated
specific tasks and to which they were admitted only upon condition they
they sacrificed their personal desires and predilections to the impersonal
goals and procedures that governed the whole.
From Coser, 1977:230-233.
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